Because of the inherent structure of the military, those POWs who perished were properly buried and accounted for. Not so, for the romusha! As often as not, they were not even buried. Most would likely have been cremated or simply left in the jungles where they had died. In addition, hundreds if not thousands, died of cholera. The Japanese were deathly afraid of cholera and had those bodies burned in huge pyres. Some say that they burned the nearly dead along with the dead! One additional indignity awaited the women who accompanied their ‘hired’ husbands. There are reports that many were sexually abused and some were forced into service in the “comfort stations” that the IJA established along the TBR route. In short, while the conditions for the Allied POWs were horrendous, they at least had the support of the military infrastructure and discipline to help sustain them. The romusha had none of this. While the IJA had a policy of keeping the various nationalities of POWs together, this did not seem to apply to the romusha. It was not uncommon for them to be sent to the many work camps in mixed ethnic groups whose languages and cultures were strange to each other. This lack of any infrastructure or support explains – at least partially — why the romusha suffered double the mortality of the POWs.
It is well documented that 70% of the 12,000 Allied POWs who died building the TBR succumbed to infectious diseases. Dysentery and Malaria were the main culprits but all manner of diseases befell them. One of the most dreaded was Cholera. But unlike the romusha, the POWs had the benefits of having been inoculated with the rather crude vaccine that was available at the time. While over 1300 POWs were documented as dying from Cholera, many more were infected but survived. This was not the case for the romusha. For them, contracting Cholera was almost a sure death sentence. Even if that had had a partial immunity from an earlier expose to this disease, they were weakened by other concurrent diseases and malnutrition such that many did not even survive for 24 hours from the onset of the symptoms. Entire camps were wiped out. POWs recount being sent into these highland camps where they were ordered burn the bodies.
In addition to the lack of anything resembling the military organization and discipline found among the POWs, the AFL were subjected to far harsher conditions than the POWs. Essentially, it was every man for himself. Even the simple procurement of the meager rations was a disorganized chore.
Even upon completion of the TBR in Oct 43, the situation for many of the romusha did not improve. While the POWs were being consolidated to camps near ThaMaKam, most of the AFL remained in the jungle on wood cutting duty. Soon after the last of the POWs reached ThaMaKam in May of 1944, the IJA established the first true hospital in the nearby city of Nakorn Pathom. Many POWs owe their survival to the treatments they received there. The AFL received no such respite. The best they could hope for was to die in one of the smaller IJA-run hospitals in the areas near their consolidation camps.
It must also be noted that the various Allied nations rapidly returned the POWs to their homes. Almost all were repatriated by early 1946. Little or nothing, however, was done for the AFL. Many of them languished in squalid camps in the Kanchanaburi are well into 1947. Dr. Boggett rightfully points out in his seminal works on the plight of the romusha that this was despite the fact that the vast majority were British subjects if not fully British citizens. London did almost nothing to assist them in returning to Malaya or Singapore.
6.0b Maj. Campbell’s report on TBR conditions
Major R. Campbell was one of the senior UK Medical Officers deployed to Thailand in JUN 1943 with the expectation that they could assist in alleviating the dire medical situation among the AFLs. Upon his return to Singapore he compiled an after-action report (NOV 45) in which he proves many unique details about the saga of the AFL.
Much of the data he cites is difficult to integrate into the larger picture, but it is worth documenting it. He opens his report with an accounting of the numbers of AFL from different sources; most of which are unverifiable.
He recounts the oft told story of the Japanese Corporal who supposedly related to an AUS Officer that there were 250,000 Malayans and 100,000 Javanese who worked the TBR of whom 170,000 died. This latter figured is agreed to be a huge overstatement. It is generally thought that 100K Javanese were taken from the island but that fewer than 10K (7500?) worked the TBR.
Another source puts the Malay-Tamil number at 80,000 of who 30,000 died. An even higher estimate of Malay-Tamil deaths is 100,000.
He also notes that some of those laborers arrived in Thailand as late as the end of 1944. It is quite possible that he is referring to those who worked the Mergui Road.
He then goes on to relate some of the lies and subterfuge that the IJA used to recruit these workers (pgs 6-7). Although other sources hinted at such, Campbell describes with confidence how some of the AFL were assigned in small groups to perform maintenance on the lower end of the TBR in Thailand. He agrees that the majority were sent to the area closer to the Thai-Burma border overlapping with the work area of the POW F Force. These workers were arriving at Ban Pong in Apr 43 intermingled with the trains carrying F Force. They then began the 2-300 Km trek via Kanchanaburi and the Tadan Bridge to their assigned work camps. By his report 1/8th to 1/5th of the AFL did not complete that journey.
K Force is said to have included 164 UK POWs, 55 AU, and 11 Du (230 in total). Campbell tells us that included 30 medical officers and 200 ORs.
The bulk of his report (pgs 10-20) relates the dire conditions that they found upon arrival at the AFL camps. As expected be provides a litany of conditions that plagued them that parallels those described by the POWs but exacerbated by the lack of education and military organization among the AFL. While the maladies were the same, the mortality was considerably worst. The Allied POWs suffered an overall mortality of 20-22%. Among the AFL it was double that. Campbell adds that the psychological depression among this group was severe and suicide was quite common. Men would simply wander off into the jungle to die. While recorded among the POWs it was far from common.
For a variety of reasons, he notes that the morality rate from cholera was about 90%. He concurrently states the POW cholera mortality to be closer to 50%, but even that might be somewhat high. The most oft quoted number of POW deaths from cholera is just over 1300. Despite the dreadful impact of cholera he notes that the greatest killer for both groups was dysentery.
He also provides some facts that are not found elsewhere. It seems that the IJA ran a parallel string of ‘hospital camps’ in this upper TBR region with the sickest of both groups being moved away from the work camps. In all cases, very little was available in the way of actual treatments; these were in fact death camps.
He tells us that there was a hospital at the Ban Pong transit camp – Likely established after trains from Singapore stopped arriving. He also notes a grossly overcrowded ‘Coolie hospital’ in Kanchanaburi (1 of 2 apparently) that experienced over 5000 deaths over the course of 18 months – presumably MAY 43 to NOV 44. He says it housed 1500-3300 at any given time, but provides no information as to its exact location.
On page 21, he provide some detailed listing of death rates among some of the AFL groups. These generally are in the range of 50% survival.
He closes out the report (pgs 22-26) by describing the conditions at the various locations where the K Force ‘ministered’ to the AFL. The words ”dreadful” and “appalling” seem to apply universally. These reports include many instances where the K Force personnel were abused and exploited by their IJA masters and forced to perform many duties other than the medical care they were intended to provide. In many if not most camps, they answered to lower ranking IJA personnel with no medical training. He cites a report that 2 of 10 physicians at Tha Mayo died of cholera after they were billeted in a former cholera isolation tent. Unfortunately, the CWCG records no such deaths.
Another fact that is evident in this report but is rarely stated elsewhere is that the largest influx of AFL began in MAR 43. The first documentation via photos that we have of AFL working alongside POWs is at HellFire Pass. Work there began on 25 APR 43. It is possible if not likely that there were small groups of AFL at other points prior to HellFire. There is a brief mention of some working on the concrete bridge at Tamarkam. But LtCol Toosey makes no mention of them. There seems little doubt that the vast majority of the AFL worked at HellFire, Hintok and beyond in the F Force area.
ADDENDUM: In his book BAMBOO DOCTOR, SS Pavilaird notes that there were 3000 AFL at the Tonchan South camp (Km 131) some 20 kilos before Kunyo.